Be Prepared for the Worst

Be Prepared for the Worst

Ron Paul, 11.16.09, 12:00 AM ET

Any number of pundits claim that we have now passed the worst of the recession. Green shoots of recovery are supposedly popping up all around the country, and the economy is expected to resume growing soon at an annual rate of 3% to 4%. Many of these are the same people who insisted that the economy would continue growing last year, even while it was clear that we were already in the beginning stages of a recession.

A false recovery is under way. I am reminded of the outlook in 1930, when the experts were certain that the worst of the Depression was over and that recovery was just around the corner. The economy and stock market seemed to be recovering, and there was optimism that the recession, like many of those before it, would be over in a year or less. Instead, the interventionist policies of Hoover and Roosevelt caused the Depression to worsen, and the Dow Jones industrial average did not recover to 1929 levels until 1954. I fear that our stimulus and bailout programs have already done too much to prevent the economy from recovering in a natural manner and will result in yet another asset bubble.

Anytime the central bank intervenes to pump trillions of dollars into the financial system, a bubble is created that must eventually deflate. We have seen the results of Alan Greenspan’s excessively low interest rates: the housing bubble, the explosion of subprime loans and the subsequent collapse of the bubble, which took down numerous financial institutions. Rather than allow the market to correct itself and clear away the worst excesses of the boom period, the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury colluded to put taxpayers on the hook for trillions of dollars. Those banks and financial institutions that took on the largest risks and performed worst were rewarded with billions in taxpayer dollars, allowing them to survive and compete with their better-managed peers.

This is nothing less than the creation of another bubble. By attempting to cushion the economy from the worst shocks of the housing bubble’s collapse, the Federal Reserve has ensured that the ultimate correction of its flawed economic policies will be more severe than it otherwise would have been. Even with the massive interventions, unemployment is near 10% and likely to increase, foreigners are cutting back on purchases of Treasury debt and the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet remains bloated at an unprecedented $2 trillion. Can anyone realistically argue that a few small upticks in a handful of economic indicators are a sign that the recession is over?

What is more likely happening is a repeat of the Great Depression. We might have up to a year or so of an economy growing just slightly above stagnation, followed by a drop in growth worse than anything we have seen in the past two years. As the housing market fails to return to any sense of normalcy, commercial real estate begins to collapse and manufacturers produce goods that cannot be purchased by debt-strapped consumers, the economy will falter. That will go on until we come to our senses and end this wasteful government spending.

Government intervention cannot lead to economic growth. Where does the money come from for Tarp (Treasury’s program to buy bad bank paper), the stimulus handouts and the cash for clunkers? It can come only from taxpayers, from sales of Treasury debt or through the printing of new money. Paying for these programs out of tax revenues is pure redistribution; it takes money out of one person’s pocket and gives it to someone else without creating any new wealth. Besides, tax revenues have fallen drastically as unemployment has risen, yet government spending continues to increase. As for Treasury debt, the Chinese and other foreign investors are more and more reluctant to buy it, denominated as it is in depreciating dollars.

The only remaining option is to have the Fed create new money out of thin air. This is inflation. Higher prices lead to a devalued dollar and a lower standard of living for Americans. The Fed has already overseen a 95% loss in the dollar’s purchasing power since 1913. If we do not stop this profligate spending soon, we risk hyperinflation and seeing a 95% devaluation every year.

Ron Paul is a Republican congressman from Texas.

Video of the inner life of a cell. Bizarre as it looks, this actually goes on inside a cell in your body.

How Goldman secretly bet on the U.S. housing crash

This is the most complete account of Goldman I have seen, their involvement in the CDOs is so evident, their intentions were stunning and very clever.

WASHINGTON — In 2006 and 2007, Goldman Sachs Group peddled more than $40 billion in securities backed by at least 200,000 risky home mortgages, but never told the buyers it was secretly betting that a sharp drop in U.S. housing prices would send the value of those securities plummeting.

Goldman’s sales and its clandestine wagers, completed at the brink of the housing market meltdown, enabled the nation’s premier investment bank to pass most of its potential losses to others before a flood of mortgage defaults staggered the U.S. and global economies.

Only later did investors discover that what Goldman had promoted as triple-A rated investments were closer to junk.

Now, pension funds, insurance companies, labor unions and foreign financial institutions that bought those dicey mortgage securities are facing large losses, and a five-month McClatchy investigation has found that Goldman’s failure to disclose that it made secret, exotic bets on an imminent housing crash may have violated securities laws.

“The Securities and Exchange Commission should be very interested in any financial company that secretly decides a financial product is a loser and then goes out and actively markets that product or very similar products to unsuspecting customers without disclosing its true opinion,” said Laurence Kotlikoff, a Boston University economics professor who’s proposed a massive overhaul of the nation’s banks. “This is fraud and should be prosecuted.”

John Coffee, a Columbia University law professor who served on an advisory committee to the New York Stock Exchange, said that investment banks have wide latitude to manage their assets, and so the legality of Goldman’s maneuvers depends on what its executives knew at the time.

“It would look much more damaging,” Coffee said, “if it appeared that the firm was dumping these investments because it saw them as toxic waste and virtually worthless.”

Lloyd Blankfein, Goldman’s chairman and chief executive, declined to be interviewed for this article.

A Goldman spokesman, Michael DuVally, said that the firm decided in December 2006 to reduce its mortgage risks and did so by selling off subprime-related securities and making myriad insurance-like bets, called credit-default swaps, to “hedge” against a housing downturn.

DuVally told McClatchy that Goldman “had no obligation to disclose how it was managing its risk, nor would investors have expected us to do so … other market participants had access to the same information we did.”

For the past year, Goldman has been on the defensive over its Washington connections and the billions in federal bailout funds it received. Scant attention has been paid, however, to how it became the only major Wall Street player to extricate itself from the subprime securities market before the housing bubble burst.

Goldman remains, along with Morgan Stanley, one of two venerable Wall Street investment banks still standing. Their grievously wounded peers Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch fell into the arms of retail banks, while another, Lehman Brothers, folded.

To piece together Goldman’s role in the subprime meltdown, McClatchy reviewed hundreds of documents, SEC filings, copies of secret investment circulars, lawsuits and interviewed numerous people familiar with the firm’s activities.

McClatchy’s inquiry found that Goldman Sachs:

•Bought and converted into high-yield bonds tens of thousands of mortgages from subprime lenders that became the subjects of FBI investigations into whether they’d misled borrowers or exaggerated applicants’ incomes to justify making hefty loans.

•Used offshore tax havens to shuffle its mortgage-backed securities to institutions worldwide, including European and Asian banks, often in secret deals run through the Cayman Islands, a British territory in the Caribbean that companies use to bypass U.S. disclosure requirements.

•Has dispatched lawyers across the country to repossess homes from bankrupt or financially struggling individuals, many of whom lacked sufficient credit or income but got subprime mortgages anyway because Wall Street made it easy for them to qualify.

•Was buoyed last fall by key federal bailout decisions, at least two of which involved then-Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, a former Goldman chief executive whose staff at Treasury included several other Goldman alumni.

The firm benefited when Paulson elected not to save rival Lehman Brothers from collapse, and when he organized a massive rescue of tottering global insurer American International Group while in constant telephone contact with Goldman chief Blankfein. With the Federal Reserve Board’s blessing, AIG later used $12.9 billion in taxpayers’ dollars to pay off every penny it owed Goldman.

These decisions preserved billions of dollars in value for Goldman’s executives and shareholders. For example, Blankfein held 1.6 million shares in the company in September 2008, and he could have lost more than $150 million if his firm had gone bankrupt.

With the help of more than $23 billion in direct and indirect federal aid, Goldman appears to have emerged intact from the economic implosion, limiting its subprime losses to $1.5 billion. By repaying $10 billion in direct federal bailout money — a 23 percent taxpayer return that exceeded federal officials’ demand — the firm has escaped tough federal limits on 2009 bonuses to executives of firms that received bailout money.

Goldman announced record earnings in July, and the firm is on course to surpass $50 billion in revenue in 2009 and to pay its employees more than $20 billion in year-end bonuses.

THE BLUEST OF THE BLUE CHIPS

For decades, Goldman, a bastion of Ivy League graduates that was founded in 1869, has cultivated an elite reputation as home to the best and brightest and a tradition of urging its executives to take turns at public service.

As a result, Goldman has operated a virtual jobs conveyor belt to and from Washington: Paulson, as Treasury secretary, sent tens of billions of taxpayers’ dollars to rescue Wall Street in 2008, and former Goldman employees populate some of the most demanding and powerful posts in Washington. Savvy federal regulators have migrated from their Washington jobs to Goldman.

On Oct. 16, a Goldman vice president, Adam Storch, was named managing executive of the SEC’s enforcement division.

Goldman’s financial panache made its sales pitches irresistible to policymakers and investors alike, and may help explain why so few of them questioned the risky securities that Goldman sold off in a 14-month period that ended in February 2007.

Since the collapse of the economy, however, some of those investors have changed their opinions of Goldman.

Several pension funds, including Mississippi’s Public Employees’ Retirement System, have filed suits, seeking class-action status, alleging that Goldman and other Wall Street firms negligently made “false and misleading” representations of the bonds’ true risks.

Mississippi Attorney General Jim Hood, whose state has lost $5 million of the $6 million it invested in Goldman’s subprime mortgage-backed bonds in 2006, said the state’s funds are likely to lose “hundreds of millions of dollars” on those and similar bonds.

Hood assailed the investment banks “who packaged this junk and sold it to unwary investors.”

California’s huge public employees’ retirement system, known as CALPERS, purchased $64.4 million in subprime mortgage-backed bonds from Goldman on March 1, 2007. While that represented a tiny percentage of the fund’s holdings, in July CALPERS listed the bonds’ value at $16.6 million, a drop of nearly 75 percent, according to documents obtained through a state public records request.

In May, without admitting wrongdoing, Goldman became the first firm to settle with the Massachusetts attorney general’s office as it investigated Wall Street’s subprime dealings. The firm agreed to pay $60 million to the state, most of it to reduce mortgage balances for 714 aggrieved homeowners.

Attorney General Martha Coakley, now a candidate to succeed Edward Kennedy in the U.S. Senate, cited the blight from foreclosed homes in Boston and other Massachusetts cities. She said her office focused on investment banks because they provided a market for loans that mortgage lenders “knew or should have known were destined for failure.”

New Orleans’ public employees’ retirement system, an electrical workers union and the New Jersey carpenters union also are suing Goldman and other Wall Street firms over their losses.

The full extent of the losses from Goldman’s mortgage securities isn’t known, but data obtained by McClatchy show that insurance companies, whose annuities provide income for many retirees, collectively paid $2 billion for Goldman’s risky high-yield bonds.

Among the bigger buyers: Ambac Assurance purchased $923 million of Goldman’s bonds; the Teachers Insurance and Annuities Association, $141.5 million; New York Life, $96 million; Prudential, $70 million; and Allstate, $40.5 million, according to the data from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners.

In 2007, as early signs of trouble rippled through the housing market, Goldman paid a discounted price of $8.8 million to repurchase subprime mortgage bonds that Prudential had bought for $12 million.

Nearly all the insurers’ purchases were made in 2006 and 2007, after mortgage lenders had lifted most traditional lending criteria in favor of loans that required little or no documentation of borrowers’ incomes or assets.

While Goldman was far from the biggest player in the risky mortgage securitization business, neither was it small.

From 2001 to 2007, Goldman hawked at least $135 billion in bonds keyed to risky home loans, according to analyses by McClatchy and the industry newsletter Inside Mortgage Finance.

In addition to selling about $39 billion of its own risky mortgage securities in 2006 and 2007, Goldman marketed at least $17 billion more for others.

It also was the lead firm in marketing about $83 billion in complex securities, many of them backed by subprime mortgages, via the Caymans and other offshore sites, according to an analysis of unpublished industry data by Gary Kopff, a securitization expert.

In at least one of these offshore deals, Goldman exaggerated the quality of more than $75 million of risky securities, describing the underlying mortgages as “prime” or “midprime,” although in the U.S. they were marketed with lower grades.

Goldman spokesman DuVally said that Moody’s, the bond rating firm, gave them higher grades because the borrowers had high credit scores.

Goldman’s securities came in two varieties: those tied to subprime mortgages and those backed by a slightly higher grade of loans known as Alt-A’s.

Over time, both types of mortgages required homeowners to pay rapidly rising interest rates. Defaults on subprime loans were responsible for last year’s housing meltdown. Interest rates on Alt-A loans, which began to rocket upward this year, are causing a new round of defaults.

Goldman has taken multiple steps to put its subprime dealings behind it, including publicly saying that Wall Street firms regret their mistakes. Last winter, the company cancelled a Las Vegas conference, avoiding any images of employees flashing wads of bonus cash at casinos.

More recently, the firm has launched a public relations campaign to answer the criticism of its huge bonuses, Washington connections and federal bailout. In late October, Blankfein argued that Goldman’s activities serve “an important social purpose” by channeling pools of money held by pension funds and others to companies and governments around the world.

KNOWING WHEN TO FOLD THEM

For investment banks such as Goldman, the trick was knowing when to exit the high-stakes subprime game before getting burned.

New York hedge fund manager John Paulson was one of the first to anticipate disaster. He told Congress that his researchers discovered by early 2006 that many subprime loans covered the homes’ entire value, with no down payments, and so he figured that the bonds “would become worthless.”

He soon began placing exotic bets — credit-default swaps — against the housing market. His firm, Paulson & Co., booked a $3.7 billion profit when home prices tanked and subprime defaults soared in 2007 and 2008. (He isn’t related to Henry Paulson.)

At least as early as 2005, Goldman similarly began using swaps to limit its exposure to risky mortgages, the first of multiple strategies it would employ to reduce its subprime risk.

The company has closely guarded the details of most of its swaps trades, except for $20 billion in widely publicized contracts it purchased from AIG in 2005 and 2006 to cover mortgage defaults or ratings downgrades on subprime-related securities it offered offshore.

In December 2006, after “10 straight days of losses” in Goldman’s mortgage business, Chief Financial Officer David Viniar called a meeting of mortgage traders and other key personnel, Goldman spokesman DuVally said.

Shortly after the meeting, he said, it was decided to reduce the firm’s mortgage risk by selling off its inventory of bonds and betting against those classes of securities in secretive swaps markets.

DuVally said that at the time, Goldman executives “had no way of knowing how difficult housing or financial market conditions would become.”

In early 2007, the firm’s mortgage traders also bet heavily against the housing market on a year-old subprime index on a private London swap exchange, said several Wall Street figures familiar with those dealings, who declined to be identified because the transactions were confidential.

The swaps contracts would pay off big, especially those with AIG. When Goldman’s securities lost value in 2007 and early 2008, the firm demanded $10 billion, of which AIG reluctantly posted $7.5 billion, Viniar disclosed last spring.

As Goldman’s and others’ collateral demands grew, AIG suffered an enormous cash squeeze in September 2008, leading to the taxpayer bailout to prevent worldwide losses. Goldman’s payout from AIG included more than $8 billion to settle swaps contracts.

DuVally said Goldman has made other bets with hundreds of unidentified counterparties to insure its own subprime risks and to take positions against the housing market for its clients. Until the end of 2006, he said, Goldman was still betting on a strong housing market.

However, Goldman sold off nearly $28 billion of risky mortgage securities it had issued in the U.S. in 2006, including $10 billion on Oct. 6, 2006. The firm unloaded another $11 billion in February 2007, after it had intensified its contrary bets. Goldman also stopped buying risky home mortgages after the December meeting, though DuVally declined to say when.

I’VE GOT A SECRET

Despite updating its numerous disclosures to investors in 2007, Goldman never revealed its secret wagers.

Asked whether Goldman’s bond sellers knew about the contrary bets, spokesman DuVally said the company’s mortgage business “has extensive barriers designed to keep information within its proper confines.”

However, Viniar, the Goldman finance chief, approved the securities sales and the simultaneous bets on a housing downturn. Dan Sparks, a Texan who oversaw the firm’s mortgage-related swaps trading, also served as the head of Goldman Sachs Mortgage from late 2006 to April 2008, when he abruptly resigned for personal reasons.

The Securities Act of 1933 imposes a special disclosure burden on principal underwriters of securities, which was Goldman’s role when it sold about $39 billion of its own risky mortgage-backed securities from March 2006 to February 2007.

The firm maintains that the requirement doesn’t apply in this case.

DuVally said the firm sold virtually all its subprime-related securities to Qualified Institutional Buyers, a class of sophisticated investors that are afforded fewer protections than small investors are under federal securities laws. He said Goldman made all the required disclosures about risks.

Whether companies are obliged to inform investors about such contrary trades, or “hedges,” is “a very hot issue” in cases winding through the courts, said Frank Partnoy, a University of San Diego law professor who specializes in securities. One issue is how specific companies must be in disclosing potential risks to investors, he said.

Coffee, the Columbia University law professor, said that any potential violations of securities laws would depend on what Goldman executives knew about the risks ahead.

“The critical moment when Goldman would have the highest liability and disclosure obligations is when they are serving as an underwriter on a registered public offering,” he said. “If they are at the same time desperately seeking to get out of the field, that kind of bailout does look far more dubious than just trading activities.”

Another question is whether, by keeping the trades secret, the company withheld material information that would enable investors to assess Goldman’s motives for selling the bonds, said James Cox, a Duke University law professor who also has served on the NYSE advisory panel.

If Goldman had disclosed the contrary bets, he said, “One would have to believe that a rational investor would not only consider Goldman’s conduct material, but likely compelling a decision to take a pass on the recommendation to purchase.”

Cox said that existing laws, however, don’t require sufficient disclosures about trading, and that the government would do well to plug that hole.

In marketing disclosures filed with the SEC regarding each pool of subprime bonds from 2001 to 2007, Goldman listed an array of risk factors that grew over time. Among them was the possibility of a pullback in overheated real estate markets, especially in California and Florida, where the most subprime loans had been made.

Suits filed by the pension funds, however, allege that Goldman made materially false or misleading statements in its public offerings, failing to disclose that many loans were based on inflated appraisals and were bought from firms with poor lending practices.

DuVally said that investors were fully informed of all known risks.

“What’s going to happen in the next few years,” said San Diego’s Partnoy, “is there’s going to be a lot of lawsuits and judges will have to decide, should Goldman have disclosed more or not?”

MERS Scandal Exposed and Explained

This is something Dawn sent me, to put on the blog, MERS has a very special interest to us as it clearly denotes how badly the meltdown went down.

MERS Scandal Exposed and Explained

December 9, 2008

Kevin Lamson

So can anyone guess the name of “organization” that was formed by Countrywide’s, Anthony Mazillo and Fannie Mae’s, James Johnson ten years ago it start with an M? No not the Mafia. It’s Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. commonly referred to as MERS. Yes that’s right Countrywide and Fannie Mae were the lead organizers of MERS and are shareholders and “members” of MERS. Here are excerpts from an investigative report on MERS I have been working on for the last several months. This may help shed some much needed light on MERS and the cozy relationships many of its so-called ‘members” have between each other and with our congress. It may also explain why no one in congress has bothered to investigate MERS and it crazy “paperless” system that these greedy mortgage executives invented so they could line their pockets by originating and flipping phony mortgage loans into so-called mortgage backed security trusts and then selling trillions of dollars of bonds to investors around the world. By reporting false profits from these sales Fannie Mae’s and Countrywide’s executives were able to make hundreds of millions of dollars in “bonuses”.

Given the extremely close relationship that MERS, its many corporate members have with the politicians who run our state and federal governments, it is not surprising that MERS and it members were able to pull off this gigantic global financial scheme without raising the brow of a State or Federal law enforcement or regulators. Only now are a few politicians and regulators paying lip service to what they refer to as the “Mortgage Meltdown”. What no politician or regulator ever seems to mention is that a millions of the mortgages that “melted down” have the name Mortgage Electronic Registration System Inc. on them.

• The Fundamentals:

In the period beginning in 1999 and ending in March of 2008, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc., a/k/a/ MERS, has been named as a “mortgagee” on over fifty million mortgages. Yet MERS has never originated a single mortgage loan nor loaned a dime to a single borrower. In 2001 the New York Supreme Court ordered the Suffolk County Clerk to accept MERS mortgages for recording as a purely ministerial duty. However the Court denied MERS request for a judgment declaring that MERS mortgages were “lawful in all respects”. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Supreme Court’s order directing the County Clerk to record MERS mortgages. The Court of Appeals did not reverse the Supreme Court’s denial of MERS request for a judicial declaration that MERS mortgages are “lawful in all respects”. MERS, for obvious reasons, did not want a published opinion determining that MERS mortgages are legal nullities and/or that MERS has no standing to enforce a mortgage when it is not a creditor entitled to collect a debt. The New York Court of Appeals did address and frame these two issues but left them to be decided at a future date.

MERS members, mortgage industry executives, invented the so-called MERS paperless system to short cut standing mortgage lending safe guards and circumvent the legal requirements for originating mortgage loans and/or for selling and transferring these loans to subsequent holders. This would allow MERS members like Countrywide Financial, Fieldstone Mortgage, and Option One Mortgage to make loans to anyone with a heart beat and then quickly flip these questionable loans to other MERS members such a Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers to name just a few. (”Secondary Mortgage Market Players’)

MERS and its so-called “system” was driven the strong desire of its founding “members” strong desire to report billions in profits as can be seen, in part, from a highly critical report issued by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise on May 23. 2006, detailing what it called “an arrogant and unethical corporate culture where Fannie Mae employees manipulated accounting and earnings to trigger bonuses for senior executives from 1998 to 2004″. . . “The image of Fannie Mae as one of the lowest-risk and ‘best in class’ institutions was a facade,” . . . “Senior management manipulated accounting; reaped maximum, undeserved bonuses; and prevented the rest of the world from knowing”. . . “Our examination found an environment where the ends justified the means”. The Ohio Attorney General recently sued another MERS founding member, Freddie Mac, alleging and its top executives for fraud with very similar allegations to the fact found by OFHEO relating to Fannie Mae.

These Secondary Mortgage Market Players would claim to package millions of these loans, with or without being delivered the promissory notes, into loan pools or “mortgage backed security trusts” and then flip the loans by selling trillions of dollars of bonds to investors around the world. The bonds were touted by Secondary Mortgage Market Players as producing safe yet high returns. The investors who bought these bonds included many of the world’s largest national banks. Initially MERS members reported windfall profits year after year by quickly originating, packaging into pools and then flipping trillions of dollars of mortgages loans to investors. Other MERS members, such as title insurance companies, also took their cut from each of the fifty million loans that were made while this high speed gravy train was rolling. MERS itself would earn over a billion dollars a year by charging its members $250.00 for each mortgage that MERS would be named as “mortgagee”.

The reported profits from the sale of these mortgaged backed securities would result in billions of dollars of salaries and bonuses being paid to the senior executives of many of MERS member corporations. Ultimately the bond investors who actually provided all the money would learn that their “safe” investment was anything but safe. As hundreds thousands and then millions of these loans fell into default. These bondholders would lose hundreds of billions of dollars. As of April 1, 2008, the largest banks around the world had already written off losses of one hundred and fifty billions dollars relating to bonds they had purchased. One Swiss bank, U.S.B., has recently reported 40 billion dollars in losses. These loses may only be the beginning. What many people refuse to admit is that because of the so-called MERS paperless “system” many of the so-called mortgage backed security trusts do not actually hold the promissory notes which evidence the debts that are supposed to be backing the bonds purchased by these investors. The situation is reminiscent to the Great Olive Oil Scandal in the late 1800’s when banks were duped into investing millions of dollars into Olive Oil only to later discover that the tanks which were supposed to be holding millions of gallons of olive oil backing their investments were mostly empty.

A June10, 2007 article in Forbes magazine details the carelessness in the securitization process by which mortgage loans were packaged and sold off to mortgage pools is now coming back to bite the trustees of these mortgage backed trusts who are now seeking to foreclose millions of loans that are in default:

• The financial engineering (i.e. mortgage securitization) helped oil the housing boom by making credit more available. But stalled housing prices and rising defaults have revealed a mess: In the rush to flip paper, lots of the new lenders or pools don’t have the proper paperwork to show they even hold the mortgage.

It appears that after MERS mortgage loans are flipped to the mortgage backed trusts the promissory notes are not actually delivered to the trustees. Nor are assignments of mortgages executed and delivered which evidence the fact the original lender has transferred the debt which is secured by the mortgage. This leaves the trusts with absolutely no paper evidence of ownership of the secured debt it purportedly owns. One informed lawyer who represents homeowners in Florida, April Charney, had foreclosure proceedings against 300 clients dismissed or postponed in 2007 for lack of standing. She is quoted as saying that “80 percent of them involved lost-note affidavits”. . . They raise the issue of whether the trusts own the loans at all,” Charney said. “Lost-note affidavits are pattern and practice in the industry. They are not exceptions. They are the rule.” Ms. Charney started challenging MERS and it members lost note affidavits after becoming skeptical of the lender could possibly lose hundreds of promissory notes.

At least two Florida judges shared Ms. Charney’s skepticism regarding the copious amounts of MERS lost note affidavits and they issued show cause orders, sua sponte, challenging MERS to show proof that it held and/or lost notes in numerous actions. After evidentiary hearings these two alert judges dismissed twenty nine (29) MERS actions to foreclose for lack of standing. One judge struck MERS pleadings as being sham.

A South Carolina court dismissed a MERS action to foreclose for lack of standing even though MERS filed an affidavit wherein a person claiming to be an officer of MERS claimed that MERS was holding a promissory note. The South Carolina court vetted the MERS affidavit claim that it was the holder of the note after the Court was apprised of the fact that MERS had previously told the Nebraska Court of Appeals that it never held promissory notes.

In late 2007 three Federal Court Judges in Ohio dismissed over fifty law suits brought by trustees of mortgage backed trusts where they could not produce the original promissory notes. Following these decisions the Bankruptcy Court in Los Angeles, California adopted a rule of practice which requires all foreclosing trustees or other plaintiffs to produce the original promissory note when bring an action to foreclose a debt or face sanctions for not doing so.

It is disturbing to know that National Banks are the trustees of thousands of trusts that may be missing millions of promissory notes. This might explain why, to date, not a single National Bank has publicly disclosed the fact that they are not actually holding what may be millions of promissory notes which evidence ownership of debts supposedly owned by their respective trusts. An independent audit of these trusts would probably be quite revealing. This writer is also unaware of any such audits that have been performed to date. These National Banks, as trustees are accountable and therefore liable for missing trust property or the documents evidencing ownership.

As more borrowers, lawyers and judges learn that neither MERS nor these trustees are actually holding the promissory notes evidencing the debts they seek to collect through foreclosure, dismissals of these foreclosure actions for lack of standing will become routine. This will also means that bondholders from around the globe will be seeking to recover their loses from the National Bank trustees.

American courts should no longer tolerate or close a blind eye to the fact that the MERS has no standing to commence any legal actions relating to peoples properties because they do not hold any legal or equitable interest in the debt or in the properties. The Court’s must protect the integrity of our court system by enforcing our laws of commerce as they have existed and not allow parties to come into our courts and commence actions relating to debts that they do not own and/or have no proof of ownership.

MERS founders and members went about foisting their so-called “paperless” system on the American economy and indirectly upon the global economy. MERS studiously avoided seeking any legislative changes of long standing commercial laws relating to promissory notes, mortgages and public recording of assignments in any of the 50 states that it would ultimately be operating. It is possible that this blatant abuse, of the UCC and state recording laws might have passed itself off as the new way off doing business in our computer age. But MERS member companies, under clear instructions from their leaders, guarantied disaster by pumping up and them dumping these shaky loans onto investors through trust they set up for this purpose. These investor/bondholders are jut now discovering that they were duped. They just don’t know how badly they were duped.

Perhaps this is what the global economy is really all about. Seeing who can dupe international banks and governments out of trillions of dollars depositor and taxpayer money and do so with complete impunity. Yet, to my knowledge, after learning that they invested trillions of dollars into these questionable loan pools n/k/a/ cesspools, not a single National Bank has ordered an audit of these cesspools or trusts to determine the actual contents and the value.
As a matter of sound public policy our courts should not allow MERS or its so-called “members” to circumvent and/or violate long standing laws of commerce, simply because some greedy mortgage executives thought they could shoe-horn their so-called “paperless system” into the framework of our current system of commerce. Our system still requires such sundry instruments as promissory notes be used to evidence debts and also requires that these instruments to change hands when sold or transferred to a new owner. Our system also requires a new holder of a promissory note to record an assignment of security interest or mortgage in order to enforce a lien which secures the debt evidenced by the promissory note. No one should be able to simply ignore these long standing laws just so they can reap billions of dollars in illicit bonuses by quickly originating and then flipping loans without the attendant delivery of notes and assignments of mortgages. Our system of commerce does not operate this way. This is because we have laws of commerce including the UCC which regulates our system of commerce.

The MERS paperless system simply provided an expedient way for MERS and its members to fleece the investor on a global basis, by loaning money to people who couldn’t or wouldn’t pay the money back and then flipping trillions of dollars of these bogus loans to third party investors. The MERS system does not comply with our current laws of commerce. While the computer age has admittedly changed how business is transacted it has not eliminated or replaced the legal requirement for such things as promissory notes, mortgages and assignments of mortgages, when a loan is made, a mortgage given and the loan is subsequently sold and/or resold. This is precisely why a competent and prudent lender who makes a loan to a qualified borrower takes back a promissory note and if the loan is to be secured the borrower executed a mortgage or security agreement naming the lender as the mortgagee or secured party. The lender must then record or file its mortgage or security agreement to prefect its lien. If the lender decides to sell the debt it is owed to a third party it must endorse and deliver the promissory note to the third party. And in order for the third party to enforce either a mortgage lien or security interest the original lender must execute an assignment of mortgage or security interest, which must then be recorded or filed by the third party to give evidence and public notice of its status as assignee of the lien securing the debt it had purchased. Only the holder of the promissory note is entitled to enforce the note and/or any lien which secured the debt.

Given the extremely close relationship that MERS, its many corporate members have with the politicians who run our state and federal governments, it is not surprising that MERS and it members were able to pull off this gigantic global financial scheme without raising the brow of a State or Federal law enforcement or regulators. Only now are a few politicians and regulators paying lip service to what they refer to as the “Mortgage Meltdown”. What no politician or regulator ever seems to mention is that a millions of the mortgages that “melted down” have the name Mortgage Electronic Registration System Inc. on them. American courts should no longer tolerate or close a blind eye to the fact that the MERS has no standing to commence any legal actions relating to peoples properties because they do not hold any legal or equitable interest in the debt or in the properties. The Court’s must protect the integrity of our court system by enforcing our laws of commerce as they have existed and not allow parties to come into our courts and commence actions relating to debts that they do not own and/or have no proof of ownership.

This writer has been investor in real estate since 1976, and has owned properties in eight states and three countries. Over the last thirty two years I have witnessed and heard of many illegal or fraudulent schemes involving real estate finance. The MERS “paperless system” is the kind of scheme that is hatched in some internet boiler room in Nigeria, not in the boardrooms of our once prestigious American financial institutions. This gigantic scheme completely ignored long standing law of commerce. The effect of the system has already had a catastrophic effects on both the American and global economy. Yet many of the investment “trusts” which supposedly hold thousands of original promissory notes are hard pressed to produce them when legally required to do so. MERS admittedly does not hold any promissory notes. A party must have possession of a promissory note in order to have standing to enforce and/or otherwise collect a debt that is owed to another party. Given these facts how will these investors ever recoup there investments if the debt they were suppose to own can not be legally enforce or collected? What will be the status of title to properties that were purportedly foreclosed by MERS where MERS admittedly had no legal right to foreclose or otherwise collect debt which are evidenced by promissory notes held by someone else.

al danna to ngarfield, Darrell, Andre, Jan, Beverly, me, June, chrismo7865, Steve, Diane

Dear Sir:

I am writing to thank you for bouncing my check with which I endeavored to pay my plumber last month. By my calculations, three nanoseconds must have elapsed between his presenting the check and the arrival in my account of the funds needed to honor it. I refer, of course, to the automatic monthly deposit of my entire salary, an arrangement which, I admit, has been in place for only eight years.

You are to be commended for seizing that brief window of opportunity, and also for debiting my account $30 by way of penalty for the inconvenience caused to your bank. My thankfulness springs from the manner in which this incident has caused me to rethink my errant financial ways.

I noticed that whereas I personally attend to your telephone calls and letters, when I try to contact you, I am confronted by the impersonal, overcharging, prerecorded, faceless entity which your bank has become.

From now on, I, like you, choose only to deal with a flesh and blood person. My mortgage and loan repayments will therefore and hereafter no longer be automatic, but will arrive at your bank, by check, addressed personally and confidentially to an employee at your bank whom you must nominate. Be aware that it is an offense under the Postal Act for any other person to open such an envelope.

Please find attached an Application Contact Status which I require your chosen employee to complete. I am sorry it runs to eight pages, but in order that I know as much about him or her as your bank knows about me, there is no alternative. Please note that all copies of his or her medical history must be countersigned by a Notary Public, and the mandatory details of his/her financial situation (income, debts, assets and liabilities) must be accompanied by documented proof.

In due course, I will issue your employee with a PIN number which he/she must quote in dealings with me. I regret that it cannot be shorter than 28 digits but, again, I have modeled it on the number of button presses required of me to access my account balance on your phone bank service.

As they say, imitation is the sincerest form of flattery. Let me level the playing field even further. When you call me, press buttons as follows:

1. To make an appointment to see me.
2. To query a missing payment.
3 To transfer the call to my living room in case I am there.
4. To transfer the call to my bedroom in case I am sleeping.
5. To transfer the call to my toilet in case I am attending to nature.
6. To transfer the call to my mobile phone if I am not at home.
7. To leave a message on my computer, a password to access my computer is required. Password will be communicated to you at a later date to the Authorized Contact.
8. To return to the main menu and to listen to options 1 through 7.
9. To make a general complaint or inquiry. The contact will then be put on hold, pending the attention of my automated answering service. Uplifting music will play for the duration of the call. Regrettably, this may, on occasion, involve a lengthy wait.

Following your example, I must also levy an establishment fee to cover the setting up of this new arrangement.

Your Humble Client

Federal Reserve Policy Audit Legislation ‘Gutted,’ Paul Says

The central bank is also buying $1.25 trillion of securities tied to home loans, so I guess the central bank is going to be hiring a lot of lawyers to fight us.

Federal Reserve Policy Audit Legislation ‘Gutted,’ Paul Says

Posted October 30th, 2009 by McPond
!! DIGG IT !!

By Bob Ivry | Bloomberg

Oct. 30 (Bloomberg) — Representative Ron Paul, the Texas Republican who has called for an end to the Federal Reserve, said legislation he introduced to audit monetary policy has been “gutted” while moving toward a possible vote in the Democratic-controlled House.

The bill, with 308 co-sponsors, has been stripped of provisions that would remove Fed exemptions from audits of transactions with foreign central banks, monetary policy deliberations, transactions made under the direction of the Federal Open Market Committee and communications between the Board, the reserve banks and staff, Paul said today.

“There’s nothing left, it’s been gutted,” he said in a telephone interview. “This is not a partisan issue. People all over the country want to know what the Fed is up to, and this legislation was supposed to help them do that.”
The Fed, led by Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, has come under greater congressional scrutiny while attempting to end the financial crisis by bailing out financial firms and more than doubling its balance sheet to $2.16 trillion in the past year. The central bank is also buying $1.25 trillion of securities tied to home loans.

Paul, a member of the House Financial Services Committee, said Mel Watt, a Democrat from North Carolina, has eliminated “just about everything” while preparing the legislation for formal consideration. Watt is chairman of the panel’s domestic monetary policy and technology subcommittee.

Keith Kelly, a spokesman for Watt, declined to comment and said Watt wasn’t immediately available for an interview. Watt’s district includes Charlotte, headquarters of Bank of America Corp., the biggest U.S. lender.

Original Language

Paul said he intends to introduce an amendment to the bill when it comes to the House floor for a vote restoring the legislation’s original language.

Representative Barney Frank, a Democrat from Massachusetts and chairman of the committee, said in interview that he intends to ensure legislation would provide a time lag between FOMC actions and the reporting of them.

Such a provision would “lessen the market impact,” he said on Oct. 20. “The importance is to see that there are no abuses and to judge what they did.”

The legislation will probably be included in a broader Democratic package of financial-regulation changes in the House, Frank said.

Last Updated: October 30, 2009 17:48 EDT

[link to www.dailypaul.com]

US Regulators Ask Banks’ Help For Commercial Realty

So I guess the banks can continue to sell the toxic assets at the fake inflated value forever then. The regulators are in bed with the banksters to shaft the homeowners forever.

Banks are being encouraged to modify troubled commercial real estate loans, which by U. S regulators say loom as a danger spot for the industry.

Issuing guidance to financial institutions, regulators such as, Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp and the Office of Thrift Supervision advised prudent loan workouts, often in the best interests of both the bank and borrower.

The troubled CRE sector has especially hit the community banks hard, basically because many of the smaller banks believing they could compete with larger banks began building up heavy concentrations of commercial loans.

Sheila Bair, FDIC Chairman says, increasingly CRE exposure will be a driver of bank failures, with the tally of failures passing the 100-mark last week, reaching 106 for the year so far, the highest since 1992.

Many of the deteriorating loans the banking industry continues to grapple with, were extended before the housing market went bust.

Even as many CRE borrowers see their financial conditions deteriorating, the regulators’ guidance says many will continue to be creditworthy borrowers, able to repay their debts.

Regulators say, taking a balanced approach, should the weaknesses in restructured CRE loans result in adverse credit classifications, institutions will not necessarily be criticized by bank examiners.

Commercial real estate loans, as of June totaled over $1-trillion or 14.2% of all banking industry loans and leases.

Since their peaking in 2007, commercial property prices have fallen 35 to 40%, with more declines anticipated, as rising job losses and high vacancy rates weaken the demand for commercial property.

N.Y. Judge Approves State Street’s $90M ERISA Settlement Despite Bank’s Objections

So the investors are hitting back, see? we were right all along.

N.Y. Judge Approves State Street’s $90M ERISA Settlement Despite Bank’s Objections

Andrew Longstreth

The American Lawyer

October 30, 2009

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There will be no do-over for State Street Bank in an $89.75 million ERISA class action settlement it agreed to in June. On Wednesday, despite the bank’s attempt to renege on the deal, Manhattan federal district court judge Richard Holwell granted preliminary approval to the settlement Wednesday.

Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann filed the class action complaint in 2007, alleging that State Street breached its fiduciary duty when it made reckless investments in subprime mortgages. On June 25 of this year, the bank received a Wells notice from the Securities and Exchange Commission, which was also engaged in an investigation of its subprime investments. The next day State Street agreed to settle the ERISA class action.

But when plaintiffs’ lawyers moved for preliminary approval of the $89.75 million deal, the bank’s lawyers at Ropes & Gray filed an objection, arguing that State Street’s ongoing negotiations with the SEC make it impossible to determine the fairness of the settlement. State Street tried to persuade Judge Howell, for instance, that class members might receive compensation from a potential settlement between the bank and the SEC — and any such SEC settlement, State Street noted, wouldn’t involve plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees. Ropes & Gray asked the judge to defer preliminary approval of the ERISA settlement until the SEC case is resolved.

Judge Holwell said no. “The ERISA settlement is, as plaintiffs point out, a bird in the hand,” he wrote, concluding that it was premature to predict what class members might recover in a possible SEC settlement. He also seemed skeptical of State Street’s concern for the class members it allegedly harmed. “Notwithstanding State Street’s laudable efforts to protect the interests of the ERISA plans,” he wrote, “the ongoing SEC negotiations provide no basis for the denial or postponement or preliminary approval.”

Neither State Street counsel Harvey Wolkoff of Ropes & Gray nor plaintiffs’ lawyer William Fredericks of Bernstein Litowitz was immediately available for comment.

This article first appeared on The Am Law Litigation Daily blog on AmericanLawyer.com.

Saudis drop WTI oil contract

This is huge news

Saudis drop WTI oil contract

By Javier Blas in London

Published: October 28 2009 20:27 | Last updated: October 28 2009 20:27
Saudi Arabia on Wednesday decided to drop the widely used West Texas Intermediate oil contract as the benchmark for pricing its oil, dealing a serious blow to the New York Mercantile Exchange.

The decision by the world’s biggest oil exporter could encourage other producers to abandon the benchmark and threatens the dominance of the world’s most heavily traded oil futures contract. It is the main contract traded on Nymex.

EDITOR’S CHOICE
Q&A: Have oil prices broken free? – Oct-28

Restructuring boosts Conoco’s production – Oct-28

Energy source blog – Jul-15

In depth: Oil – Sep-02

Corporate earnings diary – Oct-08

US petrol supplies force crude retreat – Oct-28

The move reveals the growing discontent of Riyadh and its US refinery customers with WTI after the price of the price of the benchmark became separatedfrom the global oil market this year.

The surge in oil inventories in Cushing, Oklahoma, where WTI is delivered into America’s pipeline system, depressed the value of the WTI against other global benchmarks, throwing the global oil market into disarray.

In January, WTI, which usually trades at a premium of $1-$2 a barrel to Brent, fell sharply, leaving it at a discount of almost $12 – a record gap. This dislocation in the market continued well into the summer.

From January, Saudi Arabia will base the price of oil for its US customers on a new index developed by Argus, the London-based oil pricing company.

The Argus Sour Crude Index will track the price in the physical market of a basket of US Gulf Coast crudes, including Mars, Poseidon and Southern Green Canyon.

Argus said the change in policy reflected the “increased importance of the US Gulf coast sour crude market, in which both production and trading activity was rising sharply”.

Paul Horsnell, head of commodities research at Barclays Capital in London, said Saudi Arabia’s decision was likely to reflect a “wider discontent” from its customers in the US about WTI performance.

ExxonMobil, Marathon and Valero are among the US’s biggest buyers of Saudi crude oil.

Edward Morse, chief economist at LCM Commodities in New York, said: “It is a recognition by large players that WTI sometimes does not reflect the true value of crude oil in the waterborne market.”

Saudi Arabia has priced its oil using WTI since 1994.

The price was based on quotes from the physical market which were compiled by Platt’s, a unit of McGraw-Hill.

Oil companies then covered their exposure to WTI using the futures market on Nymex.

Bob Levin, managing director of market research at the CME Group-owned Nymex, said the exchange was ready to move with the market.

“We plan to introduce a cash-settled futures contract tracking the new Argus index,” he said.

Mike Vinciquerra, equity research analyst at BMO Capital Markets, said the new Argus index would not replace WTI. “It’s more a supplement,” he said.

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AIG is chump change — let’s find corporate America’s hidden billions

AIG is chump change — let’s find corporate America’s hidden billions

It’s time to reform offshore banking, and see what untaxed wealth big business is hiding in overseas tax shelters.

By Joe Conason

March 23, 2009 | The popular urge to claw back the bogus bonuses paid by American International Group is irresistible and fully justified, but should the Treasury someday retrieve every single bonus dollar, that total of $165 million will make no difference to anyone except a few disgruntled traders. From the jaded perspective of the financiers, the uproar over the AIG bonuses may provide a welcome distraction from far more important (and lucrative) abuses in the world’s offshore tax havens.

So rather than continue arguing over chump change, it is long past time for the United States, with its international friends and allies, to demand accountability from the long list of tiny countries and principalities, from Andorra and the Cayman Islands to Singapore and Switzerland, where corporations, wealthy clients and unrepentant evildoers hide their assets.

The big claw-back will reach into quaint islands and mountainous principalities, because the same banks, hedge funds and private equity firms responsible for the world financial meltdown keep their profits in those “secrecy spaces” — alongside the ill-gotten gains of numerous drug dealers, dictators and delinquents of every description.

According to the Government Accountability Office, nearly all of America’s top 100 corporations maintain subsidiaries in countries identified as tax havens. As the GAO notes, there could be reasons other than avoiding the IRS to set up branches in places such as Singapore, Luxembourg and Switzerland, where taxes are light or nonexistent and keeping clients’ illicit secrets is considered a matter of national pride.

But what reason other than evasion could there be for Goldman Sachs Group to set up three subsidiaries in Bermuda, five in Mauritius, and 15 in the Cayman Islands? Why did Countrywide Financial need two subsidiaries in Guernsey? Why did Wachovia need 18 subsidiaries in Bermuda, three in the British Virgin Islands, and 16 in the Caymans? Why did Lehman Brothers need 31 subsidiaries in the Caymans? What do Bank of America’s 59 subsidiaries in the Caymans actually do? Why does Citigroup need 427 separate subsidiaries in tax havens, including 12 in the Channel Islands, 21 in Jersey, 91 in Luxembourg, 19 in Bermuda and 90 in the Caymans? What exactly is going on at Morgan Stanley’s 19 subs in Jersey, 29 subs in Luxembourg, 14 subs in the Marshall Islands, and its amazing 158 subs in the Caymans? And speaking of AIG, why does it have 18 subs in tax-haven countries? (Don’t expect to find out from Fox News Channel or the New York Post, because News Corp. has its own constellation of strange subsidiaries, including 33 in the Caymans alone.)

When the cost of these shenanigans was last estimated two years ago, the U.S. government’s annual loss in revenue due to tax avoidance by major corporations and super-rich individuals was pegged at about $100 billion — considerably more than a rounding error, even today. But of course that is only a rough assessment, as is the estimate of $12 trillion in untaxed assets hidden around the world. Nobody will know for certain until the books are opened and transparency is established.

Whatever the accurate accounting proves to be, it is certain to exceed hundreds of billions annually worldwide. That is money every country will need badly for years, to repay debt, finance reconstruction, and fund services, as the world economy struggles to revive itself. Even in the developing countries, where incomes are much lower and billionaires tend to be scarce, the annual revenue loss could be as much as $50 billion — enough to meet the U.N.’s Millennium Development Goals (if only the money were not stolen by local elites and wired away to numbered accounts in tax havens).

None of these tax havens could exist without the connivance or at least the cooperation of the world’s most powerful governments, which remain dominated by financial industry lobbyists even now. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has sought greater transparency from the tax havens for years, hearing promises from most and defiance from a few.

But in reality almost nothing was accomplished until last year, when U.S. law enforcement authorities began to pursue Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS) executives with criminal indictments. The UBS probe led to a settlement last month that included a fine of $780 million and an agreement to provide information about tens of thousands of American clients maintaining secret accounts at that huge bank.
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Over the past several years, however, the trend has gone the other way, with abuse of bank secrecy and the expatriation of investment and profits growing rapidly. On the tiny island of Jersey in the English Channel, for instance, the authorities responded to political pressure from hedge funds, which have placed more than $80 billion in deposits there, by establishing a “zero regulation regime” last year that literally removed all restrictions and reporting on financial transactions. Jersey’s counterparts in Guernsey and the Cayman Islands responded by assuring the hedge funds that they, too, would consider abolishing all regulation.

Perhaps the UBS case indicates a change in that unwholesome trend and a renewed willingness on the part of American authorities to crack the tax havens — which was not a priority, to put it mildly, of the Bush administration. As a senator, Barack Obama supported legislation to break open the secret financial regimes, by retaliating against countries and principalities that refuse to cooperate. Now Congress and the White House should pass such legislation and make breaking the tax havens a high priority in partnership with the European Union, the OECD and World Bank. They could start by threatening to outlaw transactions between American banks and financial institutions in any country that rejects new rules for transparency and reciprocal information.

If Americans want to make the authors of our misery pay up, then the auditors must go where the money is, as Willie Sutton might have explained — and take hundreds of billions back.

http://www.salon.com/opinion/conason/200….